Today’s
post will cover defence:
What
would happen if another party with no part in the original Israel-Palestine
difference decided to invade the disputed territories? In the hypothetical
scenario a third party such as Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom or
Russia decided to invade these territories, who would defend them?
The
ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a)
both Israel and Palestine may remain neutral; consequently the new agent would
take over the territories if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves;
b) one,
either Israel or Palestine, may respond to the invasion and defend the
territories;
c)
both Israel and Palestine may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or
independently the islands.
At the
same time, States have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests
and their population. Consequently, any act of defence is fair and just as long
as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a
TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should
be defending the disputed territory in the event of an attack on what appears
to be a common interest for all the involved parties.
In
addition to the way in which the parties would defend the third territory, there are two other crucial elements that
need to be agreed, even if joint defence was the case:
a) the
extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of
the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not
to turn their forces against the other two parties);
b) and
the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the
most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the
territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it.
Indeed,
if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend.
However, how would Israel and Palestine share the defence? The EGALITARIAN
SHARED SOVEREIGNTY addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in
order to have shared defence: a) Resources; b) Training and opportunities; c)
Safety of the other two parties (how to avoid misuse of power). What does it
mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the
case of defence are numerous. For example, geostrategic location; economic
resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of
troops; etc. In the case of Israel and Palestine, the differences are
self-evident. A combination of contributions can make these differences work
together in an efficient form.
In the
Israel-Palestine difference, it will be highly probable that the parties have a
different level of development in terms of their respective defence systems
(input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can
be fulfilled in two ways: a) following the most efficient combination in terms
of contribution (principle of efficiency)—for example, using both the local
knowledge of the people in the territory (Palestinians), the geostrategic
location (Israel and Palestine), and the equipment, resources and any means
best adapted to defending it (Israel); b) the agent with the better comparative
situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or
granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso)—for example, Israel
could train Palestinian troops in exchange for the use of certain locations.
It is
clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same
level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are
able to defend the third territory (not the territory that is already part of
the sovereign States). Thus, even if there were variations in the future in
terms of wealth status and defence development among the involved participants,
the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents. In other
words, to combine in order to to produce the most efficient result.
Next time: government and law in the
context of the Israel-Palestine difference.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive
Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Jorge
Emilio Núñez
21st
May 2018
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