Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 4) [Post 69]

Sovereignty conflicts like Crimea in which several international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same piece of land have a particular feature: their solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst the agents because it is thought that the sovereignty over the third territory can be granted to only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept (that is to say, exclusive, and not shareable).

Post 7: Territorial disputes: sovereignty

Post 8: Territorial disputes: sovereignty (cont.)

Crimea is a clear example of a zero sum game, with many negative outcomes of different sorts (e.g. social struggle, tension in international relations, and threat to local and international peace). Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level (e.g. effects on international price of oil, arms trafficking, terrorism, war).

Post 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

 

Only to have a glimpse, today’s posts included below articles from the media covering this territorial dispute. In all cases, although these sovereignty conflict has been and is object of study of many sciences—law, political sciences, international relations, only to name a few—these sciences do not share their developments and both different approaches and different languages were applied. Indeed, although multi and inter-disciplinary studies are promoted in speeches everywhere, it is more a nominal aim rather than an actual reality.

I realised that the answer was very simple. Some problems are never solved because most look for more problems, problems within a problem, or just simply give up or are so self-centred they think that problem will not affect them and hence, why would they even think about it. Ergo, the answer came to me: some problems like Crimea are never solved because people (or their representatives) do not look for a solution.

 The media coverage in recent times:

The Moscow Times
What the Russian Public Thinks of Victory Day (Op-ed)
Link to complete article

 

“Crimea’s “return” to Russia a year earlier, perceived by the population as the reinstatement of the country’s greatness, was the primary reason for the soaring ratings. Still, the celebration of Victory Day against the backdrop of the international confrontation increased the necessity to rally around leaders, while the boycotting of the military parade by the leaders of Western countries further boosted the feeling of damaged pride.”

 

UNIAN
 Crimean residents remain Ukraine nationals   Link to complete article
“all nationals who were living in Crimea at the time of its annexation were and stile are Ukraine nationals.”


The Moscow Times

Most Russians Say They Are Unaffected and 'Unworried' by Western Sanctions — Poll 
Link to complete article

“Russia has been targeted by several waves of political and economic sanctions following its 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine and support for separatist forces in southeastern Ukraine. In response, the Kremlin has imposed countermeasures including an import ban on certain foods from the European Union, the United States and other countries.”

“Russians seem to have greeted the punitive economic measures with a collective shrug, with 68 percent of respondents saying they are “completely unworried” or “not too worried” about them.” 

UKRINFORM

Mustafa Dzhemilev (Ukrainian president’s commissioner for the Crimean Tatar people)
Link to complete article

“militarization has reached tremendous proportions. Children in kindergartens are dressed in military uniforms with St. George's ribbons, they play military games, looking for intelligence officers, demining something. As I was told, they even make cakes in the form of tanks - it comes to such idiocy.

In general, Russia views Crimea solely as a military base or, as they say, an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." There is practically no economy there. Russians are building strategic facilities, first of all, a huge highway "Tavrida" across the entire Crimea, destroying green plantations, cultural monuments, as well as causing damage to the environment.

In terms of the number of troops, information is different. Numbers range from 60,000 to 80,000. But even if it is about 60,000 troops, then this is a huge number for such a small peninsula with an area of 27,000 square meters.”

 

The Moscow Times

Russia Rejects Court Ruling to Compensate Ukrainian Firms for Crimea Annexation

Link to complete article

“The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled this week that Russia must pay 18 Ukrainian businesses and one private entity a reported $159 million for lost assets in the seizure of Crimea.

“The Russian Federation doesn’t recognize the aforementioned decision because the arbitration lacks jurisdiction in considering the case."

OilPrice.Com
Russia may explore Crimea gas resources
Link to complete article

“Ukrainian media last month reported that Russia had seized some 7 billion cubic meters of natural gas from deposits around Crimea since the annexation of the peninsula in 2014. “Moscow is well aware that the offshore deposits which the gas is being stolen from are not related to Crimea, and sooner or later, it will have to bear responsibility for illegally appropriated property and compensate for the damage,” Ukrainian energy expert Mykhailo Honchar said. 

NATO estimates the oil and gas resources of the Crimean shelf at between 4 and 13 trillion cubic meters, which, the pact said, would have been instrumental in Ukraine’s drive towards energy independence from Russia.”

 

Focus

The Moscow Times: Putin Seeks Common Cause With Merkel Over Trump
Link to complete article

“Berlin and Moscow have been at loggerheads since Russia's annexation of Crimea four years ago, but they share a common interest in the Nordstream 2 pipeline project, which will allow Russia to export more natural gas to northern Europe.”

 
Jorge Emilio Nunez
Twitter: @London1701
31st May 2018

Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 3) [Post 68]

Crimea as a territorial dispute has many issues at stake. Potentially, many remedies could address the difference. The previous post presented an article that summarises the current situation and its domestic, regional and international implications.

Post 67: Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 2)

Today’s post centres the attention of one of these parties: people. What do Crimean want?

Most of the current academic and non-academic centre the attention on the 2014 referendum and its legitimacy and legality. However, there is earlier evidence about what people may have wanted. It is for that reason there are references to the 1991 referendum and the 1994 poll leading up to the events in 2014.

Nine out of fifteen Republics of former the USSR participated in the Soviet Union Referendum on 17^th March 1991. Voting results in the territory of Crimea were included in the general Ukrainian results. In Crimea (without Sevastopol city) 1 085 570 people (87,6 %) out of 1 239 092 people (turnout – 79,3 %) participated in the referendum and voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union.

 Crimean president Yuriy Meshkov in 1994 openly called for independence. Seventy percent of the peninsula’s population voted in favor of greater autonomy in a March 1994 referendum (technically, it was a poll).

In 2014 a referendum with 83.10% voter turnout confirmed by 96.77% Crimeans were in favour of reunifying Crimea with Russia. The referendum voters to choose whether to reunify “Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation” or to restore “the 1992 Crimea constitution and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine.”

Since then, the 2014 referendum has been questioned.

The UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 under the heading “Territorial integrity of Ukraine” states that the UN:

“Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of

Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.”

“Underscores that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol.”

Voter turnout in the Russian presidential election in the Crimea on March 18, 2018 was 42% of voters.

 Sources
Referendum 1991
 
Averting Crisis in Ukraine

Referendum 2014 in Crimea
 
UN Security Council Report (meeting 7138) March 2014
 
The UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 March 2014

Historical Timeline of Crimea, 1783-2014
 
Russian Presidential Election 2018 and Crimea

Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @London1701

30th May 2018

Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 2) [Post 67]

Crimea as a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE has many layers. It is clear there are domestic, regional and international issues at stake. Historical, sociological, ethnical and religious ties are present. Domestic political prestige is one of the reasons why this (and many other) TERRITORIAL DISPUTE remain in a political and legal limbo. To assume all political parties want the best for their people is not realistic (and naïve). Domestic political prestige is an important motivator to start and maintain TERRITORIAL DISPUTES.  Geostrategic location is key for many parties (not only Russia and Ukraine). There are many powers alien to the dispute with a variety of interests. Moreover, they are more interested in keeping the dispute on a status quo (ongoing) basis than achieving a solution because this situation offers them a better return, a higher payoff.

An article published by the Croatian International Relations Review in 2017 takes a multi-perspective analysis of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine in terms of Crimea. The abstract and the conclusions below summarise the answers to the questions posed by our previous post (Post 66). The link to the complete article follows.

Post 66: Territorial disputes: Crimean (Part 1)

 Russia and the Ukrainian Crisis: A Multiperspective Analysis of Russian Behaviour, by Taking into Account NATO’s and the EU’s Enlargement
by Maximilian Klotz

Abstract
“This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia’s action. NATO’s enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, political-psychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia’s pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula.”

 Conclusion
“The analysis shows that with the Russian naval base in Crimea, at least the annexation of this – and the port city of Sevastopol – by Russia can be explained. The analysis of Russia maintaining its military strength, at the analytical level of the state, was particularly revealing.

On the other hand, the expansion of NATO and the EU appears to (partly) explain Russian behaviour. In both cases, the Russian course of action was not clearly explained by the eastward enlargement of both Western institutions. In addition, Ukrainian membership of NATO, in the near future, may be considered unlikely. With regard to the EU, it has only been in the last few years that Russia has worried more about its own economy and about its Eurasian Union. Accordingly, Russia tried to prevent further economic and political rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU. Overall, the results of the analysis at the level of the system were less clear.

The construction of an enemy image of the West could be demonstrated. This, in fact, seems to serve to project domestic mischief to the outside. For the time being, this attempt by the Russian leadership may be described as successful. The hypothesis can be confirmed quite clearly.

Further steps by Russia, in the sense of an extension of its territory, cannot be ruled out, but they seem to be unlikely. With its aggressive behaviour, Russia has first of all certainly achieved one thing: The West has also experienced an increased “internal cohesion” (Maćków 2015: 98). The European states, although faced with internal political challenges, are increasing their military spending – and NATO is experiencing a “new right to exist” (Lukjanow 2016).”

Complete text available at

Russia and the Ukrainian Crisis

Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701
29th May 2018

Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 1) [Post 66]

A “recent” TERRITORIAL DISPUTE is the case of Crimea. ^“Crimea is Russian” some argue (Burke-White 2014). “[T]he United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis”, others maintain (Mearsheimer 2014). Yet some go even further and announce apocalyptically a new Cold War (Roskin 2014).

Leaving aside these and other opinions, the fact is that in early 2014 Crimea became the centre of a crisis with Russia and Ukraine as leading actors in the conflict. President Yanukovych was driven from power, Russia seized control of Crimea, and a referendum followed. Ukraine and most of the Western world considered the measures invalid (Barry 2014).

In addition to the Crimean “local” crisis in which we may recognise three agents, that is Crimea, Ukraine, and Russia, it is also a reality that this dispute has larger repercussions geographically, politically, and culturally speaking not only for the region but potentially with regards to the globe (Molchanov 2004).

While it is true that there is a crisis in the Crimean Peninsula, and tension is evident between Russia and Ukraine, there is also a fair share of rhetorical argumentation adding unnecessary considerations within legal and political sciences that do not seem to offer any tangible way out. The following posts will cover different views from people at large, politicians and academics in several disciplines such as law, political science, and international relations. We finish this post by including a very succinct background account, a couple of questions to the reader and sources.

 

Brief background account

·       Crimea lies on a peninsula stretching out from the south of Ukraine between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. It is separated from Russia to the east by the narrow Kerch Strait.

·       For centuries under Greek and Roman influence, Crimea became the center of a Tatar Khanate in 1443, which later became an Ottoman vassal state.

·       Crimea was annexed by the Russian Empire during the reign of Catherine the Great (1783).

·       Rival imperial ambitions in the mid-19th century led to the Crimean War (1853-56) when Britain and France, suspicious of Russian ambitions in the Balkans as the Ottoman Empire declined sent troops.

·       Given autonomous republic status within Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, Crimea was occupied by the Nazis in the early 1940s.

·       Crimea remained part of Russia until 1954 when it was transferred to Ukraine under the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.

·       Russia’s President Vladimir Putin signed the treaty on the ‘Restitution of Crimea and Sevastopol inside the Russian Federation’ on 18 March 2014, Russia became the first state in continental Europe to have annexed part of another state’s territory since the 1940s.

 

 

To the reader, following two of our previous posts of this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES:

a)   What are the issues at stakes in this a territorial dispute?

b)  Which remedy could be used to solve this particular territorial dispute?

 

For reference to these questions see:

POST 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

POST 10: Territorial disputes: remedies

 

NOTE: This post is based on Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. A Solution to the Crimean Crisis: Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty Applied to Russia, Ukraine and Crimea. Europe-Asia Studies.

Link to abstract and article

Sources

Barry, M. (2014) ‘The Loss of Crimea, How Much Does Ukraine Lose, and How Much Does Russia Gain, a Computable General Equilibrium Model’, Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, 2.

Burke-White, W. (2014) ‘Crimea and the International Legal Order’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56.

Mearsheimer, J. (2014) ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’, Foreign Affairs, 93.

Molchanov, M. (2004) ‘Ukraine and the European Union: a Perennial Neighbour?’, Journal of European Integration, 26.

Roskin, M. (2014) ‘The New Cold War’, Parameters, 44.

History of the Republic of Crimea, Ukraine (Valdosta State University)

Link to historical account (Valdosta State University)

The Legitimacy of Russia’s Actions in Ukraine (London School of Economics)

Link to blog article (LSE)

 

Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @London1701

28th May 2018