Tuesday 3 April 2018

Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 7) [Post 27]



The latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centred the attention on the Falkland/Malvinas islands. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to the Falklands/Malvinas respectively.

 
Post 25: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 5)

 

Today’s post will cover defence:

What would happen if another party with no part in the original conflict decided to invade the Falkland/Malvinas islands? In the hypothetical scenario that a fourth party decided to invade the Falkland/Malvinas islands, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows: a) both Argentina and the United Kingdom may remain neutral; consequently the new agent would take over the islands if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves; b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the islands; c) both Argentina and the United Kindgodm may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the islands.

At the same time, States have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defence is fair and just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should be defending the third territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a common interest for all the involved parties: the third territory.

 

In addition to the way in which the parties would defend the third territory,  there are two other crucial elements that need to be agreed, even if joint defence was the case: a) the extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their forces against the other two parties); b) and the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it. Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend. However, how would Argentina, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and the United Kingdom share the defence?
 

The egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in order to have shared defence: a) Resources; b) Training and opportunities; c) Safety of the other two parties (how to avoid misuse of power). What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the case of defence are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location; economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these differences work together in an efficient form.
 

In the Falkland/Malvinas Islands’ case, it will be highly probable that the parties have a different level of development in terms of their respective defence systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways: a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in the territory (Falkland/Malvinas Islands), the geostrategic location (Argentina), and the equipment, resources and any means best adapted to defending it (the United Kingdom); b) the agent with the better comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso)—e.g. the United Kingdom could train Argentinean and Falkland/Malvinas troops in exchange for the use of locations in any of them.
 

It is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are able to defend the third territory (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign States). Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth status and defence development among the involved participants, the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to produce the most efficient result. Brexit poses a strong question in the United Kingdom’s future.
 

For further information about defence and the Falkland/Malvinas islands see a previous post on this blog (2013) in which I reviewed a report from The House of Commons. Available at:



 

Next time: natural resources and the Falkland/Malvinas islands.

NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 Jorge Emilio Nunez
 

Twitter: @London1701
 


03rd April 2018

No comments:

Post a Comment