The
representative of each party (Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed) they are deprived
of knowledge in regard to which party they represent. So, it is reasonable for
them and likely to agree that each party has a right to participate in each
aspect of sovereignty, regardless of their particular circumstances (i.e. their
development or ability) because no one would want to be left out. In other
words, they would agree that ideally they would have “equal” shares of sovereignty
over Khemed, which means that the three claimants would have equal standing or
status. Therein, all three parties (Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed) would have a
right to participate and the decision making process in each case would be subject
to egalitarian consensus. That is to say, all the three parties should be
granted an equal input into the decision making process. They all have the opportunity
to present, and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty
of Khemed.
A second point
has to do with factual circumstances. The representatives would acknowledge
that once the negotiations were over all the three parties would have very
different situations (e.g. economic development, defence system, means for
exploitation of natural resources, law, and so on). So it is reasonable to
think that the representatives would agree that the degree of each party’s
participation would vary according to each party’s ability to contribute. It is
also reasonable to suppose that each party would as well have an interest in
each aspect of sovereignty. Therefore, and bearing in mind these two
circumstances (i.e. equal right to participate and different ability to
contribute) it is reasonable to maintain that each party would have an interest
in each aspect of sovereignty being handled in the most efficient manner.
A third point
would be to determine the level of input and output of each party with regard
to each objective/area/activity related to the sovereignty over the third
territory. In principle, the representatives may think of distributing what
benefits or rights each party would enjoy depending on the level of contribution
that the party makes. Indeed, they acknowledge that some parties will be able
to make a bigger or larger input than others. However, an immediate problem
arises. The representatives would realise that by making the output dependant
on the level of each party’s input this could result in a subterfuge for
domination. That is to say, the better off party contributing more towards one
or more areas and therefore securing a larger stake while the other two parties
were unable to make the same level of contribution that would be translated in
an ad eternum share of benefits.
But if the representatives added a
proviso in order to make sure that the party with greater ability—and therefore
greater initial participation rights—would have the obligation to bring the
other two parties towards equilibrium, the proposal becomes reasonable. That is
because it ensures the most efficient current distribution of rights and
obligations but also ensures the party that currently benefits most has an
obligation to bring the other two parties up to a position where they can
contribute equally—i.e. it has the burden to assist the other two parties to
acquire the ability to contribute equally to that particular
objective/area/activity of sovereignty over Khemed. Therein, the party with the
greater ability in whatever area would agree to this because there is no other
way of having the cooperation of the other two, and the other two parties would
agree because this arrangement requires they receive something immediately and
will eventually gain the ability to have an equal share, and they would
otherwise get nothing.
In brief,
it means:
1. Equal right to
participate (egalitarian consensus principle)
2. Nature and degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency)
3. Each party receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party contributes with (input-to-output ratio principle).
PROVISO:
4. But the party
with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the
obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium
proviso)
NOTE: Post
based on Chapter 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and
International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New
York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
2nd
February 2018
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