Saturday, 18 November 2017

BOOK [Abstract and General Structure] "Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics"

Sovereignty Conflicts and 

International Law and Politics

A Distributive Justice Issue

By Jorge E. Núñez

© 2017 – Routledge

We are used to seeing and accepting as fact that in one territory there is one population governed by an ultimate authority, with a common legal bond or system of norms. What would happen if that one territory and population had two ultimate and hierarchically equal sovereigns (legally speaking) and, at the same time, two valid sets of norms? Would it be possible, for instance, that Israel and Palestine had sovereign authority at the same time over Jerusalem? Would it be possible that Argentina and the United Kingdom were at one time sovereign over the territory and population of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands? What about Russia and Ukraine having the same degree of sovereign power over Crimea? 

There are many cases that can be characterised as sovereignty conflicts in which international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same piece of land. Besides, these conflicts have a particular feature: their solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst the agents because it is thought that the sovereignty over the third territory can be granted to only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept—i.e. exclusive, and not shareable.

In light of this obsession with absolute, long-standing disputes still continue to be presented around the world as a zero sum game, with many negative outcomes of different sorts—e.g. social struggle, bad governance, inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension in international relations, and threat to local and international peace. Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level—e.g. effects on international price of oil, arms trafficking, terrorism, war.

International relations and legal and political scholarly literature offer various potential remedies that one could use to solve the problem. These include independence, self-determination and free association—to name a few. Although these remedies are useful in certain conflicts, they are futile in several others. Hence, these conflicts remain unresolved and in a legal and political limbo. 

This book offers a fair and just way of dealing with certain sovereignty conflicts by neutralising elements that are responsible for the stagnation of this kind of disputes. Indeed, one of these elements is the historical argument that is intrinsically related to memory and emotion as instruments of national identity. I propose to see these conflicts from a different yet broad. Therein, I view the problem as a distributive justice issue following the work of Rawls. That is because distributive justice principles are a particularly appropriate tool to address sovereignty issues, just as they have previously been applied in assigning rights and obligations in other social institutions. As a consequence, reviewing different theories (e.g. ‘first come, first served’; just acquisition; the principle of equality) may help us to resolve the problem. This book aims to explore if a solution that certainly is desirable can also be possible and may offer a peaceful way of solving sovereignty conflicts through the use of principles of distributive justice.

Absolute Sovereignty, Limited Sovereignty, State Sovereignty, Sovereignty Conflicts, Distributive Justice, Rawls, Malvinas, Falklands, Kashmir, Gibraltar, Jerusalem, Catalonia, Kuril islands, Cyprus, Crimea, Quebec

To evaluate the potential for using principles of distributive justice to resolve certain kinds of sovereignty conflicts, the monograph is divided into three Parts. The First Part—i.e. Chapters One and Two—includes discussion on two preliminary potential pitfalls to this project that is the use of Rawlsian methodology and the use of the concept of ‘sovereignty’. Chapter One, the Introduction, presents some simplifying assumptions and the basic elements that constitute this study and in particular goes through the critical discussion on Rawls methodology in order to justify its application here. Chapter Two will address a key task in developing the new approach: to examine if the concept of ‘sovereignty’, which is assumed by many to be absolute, can be (and in fact, actually is) limited. This Chapter follows two lines of analysis: a) conceptual; and b) historical. 

The Second Part—i.e. Chapters Three, Four, and Five—introduces and explores the current state of affairs in international law and politics in terms of conceptual elements and potential remedies to sovereignty conflicts. Chapter Three will focus on assessing the need for a revised ‘shared sovereignty’. This and similar expressions have been used in the political and legal literature before. However, its meaning remains tangled, with specific real cases or national and international agendas making it difficult to be applied to different realities. It is for that reason this Chapter will review different ways in which this concept (in various versions or conceptions) and similar ones have been previously applied in legal and political scholarly literature. Chapter Four will examine self-ownership as a way to define sovereignty. More precisely, if it can be established that sovereignty may in theory be limited and the need of a revised ‘shared sovereignty’ the next step will be to evaluate how sovereignty can be shared—i.e. how a State can limit itself by sharing its rights and obligations and still remain sovereign. Therein, this Chapter will assess the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in parallel with the concept of ‘self-ownership’. That is because by using an analogous concept such as self-ownership that implies supreme authority but yet accepts limitations it becomes clearer how limitations can work in another supposedly supreme concept such as sovereignty. Chapter Five highlights the main remedies applied at international level to sovereignty conflicts and will explore each in order to determine whether any of them could be a reasonable solution to the sovereignty conflicts object of this project. What this Chapter will argue is that there is a need for a reasonable solution that the reviewed international remedies cannot offer.

The Third Part—i.e. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight—will explore the use of Rawlsian methodology in order to put a solution to certain sovereign conflicts, and discuss if the outcome is a reasonable remedy for them. Chapter Six will introduce and explore: a) the conditions for achieving justice—toleration, peace, etc.; b) why the ‘just acquisition’ principle may not work; and c) why the Rawlsian method of conceiving of the respective claimants as behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ just might. The latter is of utmost importance as the analysis will be conducted under these circumstances; that is, in an original position in which the three representatives will be in a particular situation, both in regard to their particular circumstances and that of the original position itself. Chapter Seven will test the proposed model by working out what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would best, realise it. In order to do that this Chapter will make use of some sovereign conflicts to show that the model can be extended from the general principles to workable institutions that realise those principles in: a) population; b) territory; c) government and law; and d) all that they imply (e.g. defence, natural resources, financial system). Finally, Chapter Eight will conclude by assessing the model’s potential and highlighting any possible limitations and implications. 

Thursday, 16 November 2017

Mafia de la KGB (2 de 16 partes) por Oleg Grechenevsky (autor invitado)

Las personas mayores todavía recuerdan cómo se les enseñó la ciencia de las "tres fuentes" y las "tres partes constituyentes" del marxismo. Nuestro régimen criminal tiene una "fuente" y un "componente": la KGB. Todas las demás "partes" son solamente guirnaldas para decorar este monstruo.

Cómo comenzó todo.
En 1982, Andropov se convirtió en nuestro rey. Antes de esto, 65 años de poder eran apparatchiks del partido. Ni los militares, ni los Chekistas al "timón" nunca estuvieron cerca. Incluso fueron introducidos al Politburó de mala gana y sólo por "méritos" especiales. Y de repente Andropov se convirtió en el primer secretario del Comité Central, y después de la muerte de Brezhnev, el general.
Por supuesto, el aparato estatal siempre estaba unificado, pero los "siloviki" estaban ocupados en su propio departamento, "ejecutivos de negocios" con los suyos. Y el liderazgo del Partido tenía un liderazgo general.
Solamente los Chekistas podían quitarles el monopolio del poder. La fiesta era muy consciente de la terrible bestia que mantenía en la cadena, como un perro guardián. Pero los comunistas no podrían prescindir de eso. Jrushchov trató de reducir drásticamente y debilitar los "órganos": al mismo tiempo comenzaron las rebeliones y los disturbios. Primero en los "países hermanos", luego en nosotros (Novocherkassk). La intelligentsia, también, no apreció este don del partido, comenzó la vacilación y la fermentación, ¡hasta el abstraccionismo! Tuve que fortalecer urgentemente la KGB ...
Bajo Brezhnev, los Chekists gradualmente recuperaron su poder a su tamaño anterior. Leonid Ilich nunca interfirió con nadie, como la reina inglesa ...
Sólo había una forma de mantener controlado al monstruo chekista. De todos nuestros gobernantes, esto fue hecho solo para el camarada Stalin. A saber:
1.Nuzhno mismo convertido en un verdadero jefe de la NKVD.
2. Necesitamos periódicamente "rotar al personal", disparar de vez en cuando toda la parte superior de Chekist.
Y si no lo hace, entonces es mejor escupir en todo y dar a los Chekists todo el poder, y la mayoría para imprimir los "recuerdos" y obtener los pedidos ...

Entonces, incluso durante la vida de Brezhnev, hubo un "golpe progresivo", que nadie notó. A la gente no le importaba, a los miembros del partido en general, también, ya que la "represión irracional" para la nomenclatura estaba en el pasado distante. Es cierto que hubo una pequeña ola de arrestos por casos de corrupción (Minrybprom, Georgia, etc.). Pero los Chekistas no iban a "erradicar el mal.” Era necesario intimidar la nomenclatura, para que los miembros del partido entendieran quién estaba a cargo. "Mantener el anzuelo", por lo que siempre fue llamado por los Chekists.

Referencia (libro en ruso):

Oleg Grechenevsky

Mafia of the KGB (2 of 16 parts) by Oleg Grechenevsky (guest author)

 Older people still remember how they were taught the science of the "three sources" and "three constituent parts" of Marxism. Our criminal regime has one "source" and one "component" - the KGB. All other "parts" are just tinsel for decorating this monster.

How it all began.
In 1982, Andropov became our king. Prior to this, 65 years of power were party apparatchiks. Neither the military, nor the Chekists to the "rudder" were even nearly never allowed to go. They were even introduced into the Politburo reluctantly and only for special "merits". And suddenly Andropov became first Secretary of the Central Committee, and after Brezhnev's death, General.
Indeed, the state apparatus was always unified, but the "siloviki" were engaged only in their own department, "business executives" with their own. And the Party leadership had a general leadership.
It was only the Chekists who could take away the monopoly on power from them. The Party was well aware of the terrible beast she kept on the chain, like a guard dog. But the communists could not do without it. Khrushchev tried to sharply reduce and weaken the "organs"; at once rebellions and riots began. First in the "fraternal countries", then at us (Novocherkassk). The intelligentsia, too, did not appreciate this gift of the party, wavering and fermentation began, right down to abstractionism! I had to urgently strengthen the KGB ...
Under Brezhnev, the Chekists gradually regained their power to their former size. Leonid Ilich never interfered with anyone, like the English queen ...
There was only one way to keep the chekist monster in check. Of all our rulers, this was done only to Comrade Stalin. Namely:
1.Nuzhno become a real head of the NKVD.
2. We need to periodically "rotate staff", shoot from time to time the entire Chekist top.
And if you do not, then it's better to spit on everything and give the Chekists all the power, and most to print the "memories" and get the orders ...

So, even during Brezhnev's life, there was a "creeping coup", which no one noticed. The people did not care, to the party members by and large, too, since "unreasonable repression" for the nomenclature was in the distant past. True, there was a small wave of arrests on corruption cases (Minrybprom, Georgia, etc.). But the Chekists were not going to "eradicate evil.” It was necessary only to intimidate the nomenclature, so that the party members understood who was in charge. "Keep on the hook," so it was always called by the Chekists.

Reference (book in Russian):

Oleg Grechenevsky